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Introduction
In recent years game semantics has provided an accurate model for various programming languages, leading to the first full abstraction results for a variety of languages and in a unified way [AM99] . In such models programs are interpreted as strategies, i.e. highly constrained (sets of) processes; and adding semantic power corresponds to weakening restrictions on such sets.
An early success was providing a the first fully abstract model of PCF [AJM95, HO00] , answering a challenge first posed in [Plo77] . In this case we need to restrict our strategies to representing pure functions, using a construct known as innocence which states that the strategy isn't allowed to depend on the entire history (state) but only part of it; a relevant context. So on the one hand we are dealing with intensional processes; but on the other hand we are dealing with pure functions (albeit only the sequential ones). This conflict rears its head in the full abstraction result for PCF, where observational equivalence only holds when one identifies strategies that cannot be distinguished by an innocent test.
Example We shall define two candidate innocent strategies for addition, add LR and add RL over the game N × N ⇒ N, which evaluate their arguments left-toright and right-to-left respectively. Let q represent the unique O-question in the game N, and m and n range over the natural numbers. Maximal plays of add LR are then of the form:
Maximal plays of add RL are of the form:
We note that the strategies add RL and add LR are not equal. However they are not distinguishable by any innocent test -for any innocent strategy α : (N × N ⇒ N) ⇒ Σ we have add LR ; α = add RL ; α. If we identify such innocentlyindistinguishable strategies, we factor out information such as the number of times and order arguments are interrogated, which are irrelevant details in a functional world; and it is with respect to this identification that the full abstraction results for PCF in [AJM95, HO00] hold. However, quantifying over all innocent strategies doesn't seem far from quantifying over all innocent contexts, so it would be better if we could get a more concrete handle on this observational preorder. Loader's result [Loa01] places some restrictions on this: it was shown that observational equivalence of PCF and finite base types is undecidable. But nonetheless a more concrete presentation can be given: here we introduce a candidate concrete representation of innocent strategies (or PCF terms), and we define a map from innocent strategies into this structure. This map identifies precisely those strategies that are observationally equivalent. We believe this can be used to construct a fully abstract model of PCF explicitly, with no need of such a quotienting.
Main Result

Views and Duality
We recall standard definitions from game semantics of arena, justified sequence, play, function space, strategy etc from e.g. [AM99] . In particular we recall the definition of O-view and P-view :
Definition We define the P-view of a play by We also recall the definition of the game Σ = ({q, a}, {q → OQ, a → P A}, { * ⊢ q ⊢ a}, {ǫ, q, qa}) and note that there are two strategies on this game, ⊤ = {ǫ, qa} and ⊥ = {ǫ}. The game Σ allows us to note a duality between O-views and P-views, since a single-threaded play in A → Σ consists of a play in A with the roles of P and O reversed. This is useful to us because of the following lemma:
If qs is P-view in A → Σ and s is a play in A, then s is an O-view in A.
Proof O-views in A are precisely the plays of the form 
In particular we will use this to note that innocent strategies for A → Σ (i.e. innocent tests for A) coincide with O-view functions on A. Further it is known [McC96] that Linear Tests Suffice, so we only need consider such O-view functions that deal with a single thread.
Definition A set S of well-bracketed O-views over an arena A is O-deterministic if so 1 , so 2 ∈ S implies o 1 = o 2 , each s ∈ S is single-threaded, each s ∈ S begins with the same initial move.
Definition If S is an O-deterministic set over the arena A, we can define the innocent strategy α S :
The above uses the observation that if qs is a P-view in A → Σ that does not end in a Σ then s is an O-view in A. We note that such strategies yield well-bracketed plays since the O-views in S are well-bracketed, hence are the combination of Pview/move pairs found in α S . We will soon show that innocent tests on A of the form α S are the only ones needed to distinguish two observationally inequivalent strategies; where observational inequivalence comes from the following preorder:
Definition Let σ, τ : A be innocent strategies. We write σ ≤ ib τ if for any innocent α : A → Σ if σ; α = ⊤ then τ ; α = ⊤.
O-view Sets
We shall now use some of these ideas to show that two innocent strategies are observationally equivalent if and only if their sets of O-views of prefixes of complete single-threaded plays are the same.
We note that in a world of innocent strategies alone, a strategy is equivalent to its set of O-innocent traces (since after all, these are the only traces that can be "realised" by an innocent opponent). It is also clear that all plays in an innocent strategy are P-innocent.
Definition Given a play s, define ovw(s) = { t : t ⊑ s}.
Proof Suppose so 1 , so 2 ∈ ovw(s)
We know that each s ′ ∈ ovw(s) is single-threaded, since the O-view of a prefix of a single-threaded play is also single-threaded.
We know that each s ′ ∈ ovw(s) begins with the same initial move, since each s ′ is the O-view of a prefix of s and as such must begin with the initial move of s (since the O-view of a play contains its first move).
We can now substantiate our remark above regarding observational equivalence: Proposition 2.4 σ ≤ ib τ iff for any O-deterministic set S on A we have σ; α S = ⊤ implies τ ; α S = ⊤ Proof Clearly if σ ≤ ib τ the RHS holds by innocence of α S .
Conversely, if σ ≤ ib τ does not hold then we have α such that σ; α = ⊤ and τ ; α = ⊥. By Linear Tests Suffice we may assume that α consists only of plays that interrogate their argument once, i.e. plays which are single-threaded when restricted to A. Thus we have an interaction sequence s with s = q Σ s ′ a Σ ∈ α with s ′ ∈ σ. Since s ∈ α S and α S is innocent we know s must be P-innocent. By 2.1 it follows that s ′ must be O-innocent. Further we know s ′ is single-threaded and complete (by well-bracketedness), and so ovw(s ′ ) is O-deterministic by 2.3. Also, it is clear that s ∈ α ovw(s ′ ) . Thus we have σ; α ovw(s ′ ) = ⊤. Since α ovw(s ′ ) ⊆ α and τ ; α = ⊥ it follows that τ ; α ovw(s ′ ) = ⊥ since composition is monotonic. Hence RHS does not hold in the case that S = ovw(s ′ ).
We now formally define the set of observations over a strategy σ, as the O-views of the prefixes of the complete, single-threaded, O-innocent plays.
Definition Given an innocent strategy σ, define obs(σ) = {ovw(s) :
We thus have two constructions, obs that takes an innocent strategy and returns a set of O-view sets, and S → α S which takes an O-deterministic set and returns an innocent strategy. We can relate these constructions.
Proposition 2.5 Let S be an O-deterministic set on A and σ and innocent strategy on A. Then σ; α S = ⊤ if and only if S ⊇ T ∈ obs(σ)
Proof Suppose σ; α S = ⊤. Then exists interaction sequence qsa with s ∈ σ complete; and such that if to ⊑ s then t o ∈ S. Thus ovw(s) ⊆ S. But ovw(s) ∈ obs(σ) since s ∈ σ is complete (well-bracketedness), O-innocent (since qsa ∈ α S is P-innocent), and single-threaded (since S is O-deterministic) so S ⊇ ovw(s) ∈ obs(σ) as required.
Conversely, if S ⊇ T ∈ obs(σ) then T = ovw(t) for some complete, Oinnocent, single-threaded play t ∈ σ. Consider the play q Σ ta Σ in A → Σ. To show that σ; α S = ⊤ it will suffice to show that q Σ ta Σ ∈ α S . To see this we need to check that for all t ′ with q Σ t ′ p ⊑ t, ( q Σ t ′ , p) ∈ α S where t ′ is an even length sequence. If p = a Σ then we must have t ′ = t and 2.2 tells us that ( q Σ t , a Σ ) = (q Σ t , a) ∈ α S since t is both complete and in ovw(t) = T , and hence S. If p is a move in A then (
is in ovw(t) = T (and hence S).
Hence q Σ ta Σ ∈ α S after all, giving us the interaction sequence witness yielding σ; α S = ⊤.
Full Abstraction
In order to show that σ = ib τ iff ovw(σ) = ovw(τ ), we first show an inequational version. The observational preorder does not correspond to the subset ordering; instead it corresponds to the following ordering:
Definition Suppose σ and τ are sets of O-deterministic sets of O-views over an arena A. Write σ ≤ os τ if ∀S ∈ σ∃T ∈ τ with T ⊆ S.
It is clear that ≤ os is a preorder. Proposition 2.6 σ ≤ ib τ if and only if obs(σ) ≤ os obs(τ ) Proof Suppose σ ≤ ib τ and S ∈ obs(σ). Then by 2.5, σ; α S = ⊤. Then by assumption τ ; α S = ⊤. Then by 2.5, S ⊇ T ∈ obs(τ ).
Conversely, suppose σ; α S = ⊤ for some O-deterministic set S (invoking 2.4). So S ⊇ T ∈ obs(σ) by 2.5. Then since obs(σ) ≤ os obs(τ ), T ⊇ R ∈ obs(τ ). So S ⊇ R ∈ obs(τ ). So by 2.5 τ ; α S = ⊤, as required.
We have now shown that σ = ib τ iff ovw(σ) = os ovw(τ ). We shall now show that this is equality of O-sets by showing that ≤ os is antisymmetric for the kind of sets we are dealing with.
We note that ≤ os is not antisymmetric on general sets of O-deterministic sets. Let σ = {{q 2 q 1 5 1 , q 2 0 2 }, {q 2 0 2 }} and τ = {{q 2 0 2 }} on the arena N → N. Each set in σ and τ are O-deterministic, and we have σ = os τ with σ = τ . However the strategy σ does not come from any innocent strategy, since the strategy would have to both query and not query its argument. Thus we need to put further restrictions on these sets of O-deterministic sets regarding how the O-deterministic sets can interact with each other -a condition of determinacy.
Definition An observational strategy on A consists of a set σ of O-deterministic sets over A such that if S, T ∈ σ with S = T then there exists a play t and O-moves o 1 , o 2 with o 1 = o 2 such that to 1 ∈ S and to 2 ∈ T .
This says that if two O-deterministic sets differ, then they first differ at an O-move.
Proposition 2.7 For each innocent strategy σ, obs(σ) is an observational strategy.
Proof Suppose ovw(s) = ovw(t). Then it follows that s = t. Since s, t ∈ σ they must first differ at an O-move by the determinacy condition on strategies. Thus ro 1 ⊑ s, ro 2 ⊑ t for o 1 = o 2 . Then ro 1 = r o 1 ∈ ovw(s) and ro 2 = r o 2 ∈ ovw(t) with o 1 = o 2 as required.
Proposition 2.8 If σ is an observational strategy, S, T ∈ σ with S ⊆ T then S = T .
Proof Suppose S ⊆ T and for contradiction that S = T . Then there exists t, o 1 , o 2 with to 1 ∈ S, to 2 ∈ T and o 1 = o 2 . But then to 1 ∈ T since S ⊆ T . Thus to 1 , to 2 ∈ T with o 1 = o 2 . This contradicts O-determinacy of T .
From this it is simple to show that ≤ os is antisymmetric:
Proposition 2.9 Let σ and τ be observational strategies such that σ ≤ os τ and τ ≤ os σ. Then τ = σ.
Proof It will of course suffice to show wlog that σ ⊆ τ . Let S ∈ σ. Then since σ ≤ os τ we have T ⊆ S with T ∈ τ . Then since τ ≤ os σ we have S ′ ⊆ T with S ′ ∈ σ. Then S ′ ⊆ S with both in σ so it follows by 2.8 that S = S ′ . Since S ⊆ T ⊆ S it follows that S = T , i.e. S ∈ τ as required.
We can now show our main result. Theorem 2.10 Two innocent strategies σ and τ are observationally equivalent if and only if obs(σ) = obs(τ ).
Proof Suppose σ = ib τ . Then σ ≤ ib τ and τ ≤ ib σ. Then by 2.6, obs(σ) ≤ os obs(τ ) and obs(τ ) ≤ os obs(σ). But by 2.7 both obs(σ) and obs(τ ) are observational strategies. Thus by 2.9 we have obs(σ) = obs(τ ).
Conversely if obs(σ) = obs(τ ) then obs(σ) ≤ os obs(τ ) and obs(σ) ≤ os obs(τ ) since ≤ os is clearly reflexive. Then σ ≤ ib τ and τ ≤ ib σ by 2.6 so σ = ib τ as required.
To return to our example, it is easy to see that obs(add LR ) = obs(add RL ) -and the same result is obtained if we consider obs of any other add strategy (e.g. interrogation of arguments multiple times). We precisely forget repetition and ordering in this construction, and thus only represent "purely functional" behaviour.
A Fully Abstract Model?
We may use the above result to formulate a fully abstract model for PCF.
Definition We define the category OBS L . Objects of OBS L are games. An arrow s : A → B is a set of sets of O-views of plays over the game A ⇒ B such that σ = obs(τ ) for some innocent strategy σ s : A ⇒ B. The identity e for an object A is given by obs(id A ) where id A is the copycat strategy on the game A. If s : A → B and t : B → C, we define composition s; t as the observational strategy given by obs(σ s ; σ t ).
We can show that composition in OBS L is well-defined via the following proposition, following from 2.10 and results in [AM99] .
Proposition 3.1 If σ 1 , σ 2 : A → B, τ : B → C are innocent strategies with σ 1 = ib σ 2 then σ 1 ; τ = ib σ 2 ; τ . Similarly if σ : A → B, τ 1 , τ 2 : B → C with τ 1 = ib τ 2 then σ; τ 1 = ib σ; τ 2 .
We can see that OBS L is indeed a category by appealing to associativity and identity in the category C inn . We can then give a denotation of PCF in this category -the denotation of types are the same as that for the game semantic model, and the denotation of a term S is given by obs( S ib ).
The above treatment gives a concrete fully abstract "model" of PCF, but it doesn't give us any extra information about how the terms of PCF look denotationally. In particular it would be good to define precisely which observational strategies come from an innocent strategy, and to define their composition directly -this would explicitly yield a categorical model which is full abstract for PCF. This seems possible, but many details need checking; this is left for future work.
